*	Protocol of Audio tape
*	NoteCards  PLOT
*
*	Experiment X500 / July 19, 1984 / E: LM, SC / S324
*
*	Filed on  {PHYLUM}<MONTY>DATA>X511-PROTOCOL-TRANSCRIPT
*
*	August 5, 1985
*
*	Files used in experiment:
*
*	Starting file-	{PHYLUM}<MONTY>DATA>X500A-NATO-MISSILES.NOTEFILE
*
*	Ending file-	{PHYLUM}<MONTY>DATA>X500B-X501A-NATO-MISSILES.NOTEFILE
*
*	Audio tape-	X500 NoteCd-AX  7/19/84  S324
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[Discusses general topics:  Where Ken is in project (Data collection), what he has been hired to do (act like analyst), what he is going to write about (this is the body of the transcribed protocol).]

37	E	Could you sorta fill me in on what, what you think about again as the main issues in the Nato Missiles.
39	S	Well, I think what I said, whata, heh, I have to try to be consistent with what I said last time.
41	E	No you don't, noI... In fact I'm interested in to some extent how, how your ideas about it change over time as you as you worked with the
42	S	Uh
	E	information.
	S	Well, I mean, I I uh, wha, as I said before, I think what th the thing I'm,I've sort of started with is the idea of trying to figure out whether it was a good, whether it was a good decision,  and  and
44	E	tua put the missiles in
	S	missiles in Europe, right, and, um, and so Iss, there's, there's, y'know, several different dimensions to it and the, there's the sorta military technical kinda dimension about whether it makes sense in military terms even to, to have done it.  And there's, there's the (ahem) the dimension of the political repercussions, in the sense that, uh, there's a lot of opposition to the deployments in Europe and it's changed, uh, internal du,d, you know, policy in Europe, in in the contries, and it's also changed the relationship of the various Nato countries to each other and to the United States as well, and so those, looking at those kinds of, those, y'know, sort of a political dimension and a military dimension, I think, in MY opinion are buh, they they ended up both being, I mean, they're bad, uh the decision was bad in both those senses, but um, um, probably muh-more people would argue that it makes sense militarily but not necessarily politically,  but I don't think it makes sense either way.
55	E	You don't think, oh you don't think it makes sense militarily?
	S	NO!, it was stupid. I mean, the, um, the problem (heh), the problem is that tha uhm ... you esyugeu, there's a big geographic component to this and the, and I think we talked about this last time where the Soviet Union's in Europe,(heh-heh)y'know, and we're not.. And so for them to have missiles in the Soviet Uni-union aimed at Europe doesn't mean the same thing as US having missiles in Europe aimed at the Soviet Union.  I mean, there's a different, there's a different logic there.  The Soviet Union, bcu, partly because of its geographic component doesn't believe in the distinction between tactical nuclear weapons and, and strategic nuclear weapons.They think they're all one thing.  It doesn't matter, um. Whereas we try to maintain this distinction.  So to them, uh, the SS20 missile is, which is aimed at Europe is just another component of their overall, y'know, uh, force and, whereas to us and our pershing missiles in Europe are something divorsed from our missiles back at home. And the thing that most people don't realize is that the Soviet Union had, ss, missiles which will do basically the same thing as the SS20, only older, and not as efficient, they're not as long range, they're not as accurate, blablabla, since ther um 1960's.  Whereas we've NEVER had missiles like the pershing 2 or the cruise missile in Europe.  And so, what wer, we're saying tha that we, like in our negotiating position was that we won't if if if they withdraw their SS20's, we won't deploy the pershing 2 and cruise missiles, but to THEM, that's giving away something they already had so that we won't do something we we've Never had.
74		Which from their point of view is nonsense, of course. And, so,ime, even militarily speaking it, I mean, its intruth escalating a situation which is already very tenuous, Imean, the situation, the nuclear situation in Europe is very dangerous. and then for us to go and add something else to it, I think was really sort of, at least in the way that we did it.  Um, I mean, you can probably make an argument that we might of, y'know, some, many of our weapons in Europe are very old.  Nuclear weapons are something that need to be replaced, so you can make that argument, but wi that's not really what we were doing.  If we were doing that,then how come the pershing missle has, y'know, like three times the range of its, the thing that it's replacing.  It's not really replacing it, it's something new. And so, I doa, think it was really.. I think think th the problem was uz that we didn't think about it from the point of v-iew of the Soviet Union. I mean, we only thought about it in the point of view, we-well, we ha we have the capability of doing this now, so therefor we should.  But we didn't think about how they would think about it, and its obviously, Imean, we're nah, the Soviet Union and the United States are not negotiating about it.  I mean, Reagan and all those people said that by deploying the missiles you would have, they would MAKE them negotiate. But they said, if you deploy the missiles we WON'T negotiate and of course they don't, they won't.
		Elef ard a to convince them.  I think this it's sort of silly. (heh)
89	E	Well, d-do you really think that if we had put in, well, I-I'm wondering, y-yknow, what you think. We put in something less than th-the pershing 2 missiles.  Thu- would it have been ok?
92	S	Wel..  well,I mean, I th I I think that we should be negotiating to reduce the numbers of weapons there, but assuming, let's say that we decided that the pershing 1-A's which are the missiles that the persing 2's replaced are too old and we need to replace them, well replace them with a modernized version. In other words, something that does basically the same thing, but does it more efficient.  Th-bhu-thu, um, and they could DO that easily. Now if they could basicly use the the difference between the pershing one and the pershing two is basically the the um reentry vehicle.  The um warhead (parking) on the pershing  2 is much much more accurate.  Um by orders of magnitude, and as a result they can have a smaller warhead on it and therefor carry more fuel so it has longer range.  And uhm, well, if we were just interested in modernizing the pershing one then why didn't we just make it have the same range?  But noa- but now we've made a missile that will actually reach into the Soviet Union.  Whereas the pershing one never did that.  And we've never, the United States has NEVER had a missile in Europe that can reach the Soviet Union until now.  Although, the Soviets always claimed the British and French nuclear weapons should be counted as a part of that force, but we would always say that they won't, but the United States proper, I mean, these are OUR missiles, we own them, has never had ones that would reach to the Soviet Union.  Whereas the Soviet Union has always had missiles that can reach from muh from the Soviet union into Europe.  So there, Imean, it its, there's a big difference I think.  And I, I mean, so I I think that thu there was just a lot of, I think was just a .. bad planning, I mean I really think that we didn't,  when we decided, we thought that no one would care.  We'd just put in these missiles and no one would care. And that's .. Stupid, y'know(heh-heh).  Buh..
111	E	Oh, they really thought that-tha-da..
112	S	Well, they tho, they thought that they could slip it in.  They, the original, ya see they were tryi, especially in the case of the pershing 2 they they were trying to disguise it as a modernization program. I mean, that's what it started OUT as.  The original pershing 2 missile was going to have the same range.  As the pershing one.  And then they just kept sort of sneaking it up, the range.  And um, uh, so then we thought that we would just portray it as a modernization program.  We're just replacing these old missiles with these new missiles, right.  And, yknow, the fact that they can reach into the Soviet Union, well, we won't talk about that too much, right?  And um buh,yknow, people (e um fa)didn't go for that. The Soviets didn't like it and a lot of people in Europe didn't like it either.  And one of the reasons that the people in EUROPE don't like it is because that means the places near where the pershings are NOW are the places the Soviets are gonna wanna hit themselves.  So, yknow, it makes them more dangerous for the people that are nearby.  That's one reason they didn't like them.
122	E	What were the missiles that were there before?
123	S	They were per-per, they were, well, we have there's lots of different nuclear weapons ranging from, y'know, ones that get shot out of cannons that have really rather short range to um, ones, y'know like, y'know ICBM's that can laun- we can launch from here to get them.  And there's, y'know, there for different missions. Like the pershing 1A had a, had a range from about 400 miles so the idea was that say, if the Soviets attacked into Europe, they would use those missiles to hit troops behind the line and hit railroad yards, um, those kinds of things to block their passage up.  They weren't meant to hit into the Soviet Union, but t-to block the the roads and things like that coming from the Soviet Union into Europe.  And then th-there's missiles of even much shorter range, and that are meant for sorta the same thing only much closer to the battle.  
134	E	It's sorta interesting that, y'know, that these missiles would be situated in-in Europe designed to hit Europe, yeh, only to block, but still..
135	S	Wu-well, I know, tha-that's, I mean, that's, there's a huge logical problem that people have recognized since we started using nuclear weapons in Europe and that is that Europe is a very(heh-heh) densely populated continent.  So how can you use nuclear weapons to defend some place because you're gonna kill the people you're trying to defend. Th-there's a saying which is literally true.  The towns of Germany are two kilotons apart.  In other words, a two- a two kiloton, which is very small nuclear weapon dropped on one town will affect the next one over.  So when (wer de feu) we're just going to be dropping these bombs trying to stop the Russians, and we're going to be killing the German people, so it doesn't make sense.  But, the logic for nuclear, having a nuclear defense was, well, one of the reasons is that it's cheaper than having large armies.  It's, y'know, its cheaper to have all the nuclear weapons than it is to pay, y'know, twice as many people or whatever now.  But , uh, and so there's a lot of, nowadays there's a lot of move toward, um, beefing up conventional defense so that we're not as dependent on the nuclear weapons because of this logical problem.  E(ahem) the other part of the logical problem is that if indeed (heh-heh-heh) so, okay, so, if the Soviet Union attacks, then we have to decide whether we are going to use the nuclear weapons.  And we may well decide that we won't because of this problem. An, Which means that the Soviet Union can think well they're not going to use these weapons, because they're afraid of killing their own people therefore we're safer to attack. I mean, it-it's one of these outguessing each other things.  And it gets to be really convoluted, so we have to we have to make all sorts of pronouncements about how we're ready to use our nuclear weapons so as to keep everybody thinking that we will.  um.  And that's why a lot of people in Europe are very sensitive about anything that seems like the United States is becoming less willing to use Nuclear weapons in Europe.  Because they're worried, th-the people in Europe are interested in what is called Pure Deterrance, in other words, that, y'know balance of terror kind of thing where no one is going to do anything because the other side is going to crush them if they try.  Um, and the euro-Europeans are very interested in that.  They want to try to keep everything absolutely stable, um, s-so anything th-th-that smacks of us not being willing to just go all out right away, there are many people, n y'know, sort of defense officials and things like that in Europe are sort of worried about because they think that it means that it gives the soviets an an advantage.
166		




435	E	What kind of paper are you planning to write?



833	end of tape
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